Resumen
We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity.
| Idioma original | Inglés estadounidense |
|---|---|
| Páginas (desde-hasta) | 173-193 |
| - | 21 |
| Publicación | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volumen | 49 |
| N.º | 1 |
| DOI | |
| Estado | Indizado - 1 mar. 2020 |
| Publicado de forma externa | Sí |
Nota bibliográfica
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